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In January 2020, a group of concerned experts convened in San Diego, 
California to discuss solutions to the humanitarian and migrant health 
crisis at the United States (U.S.)-Mexico border.1 My co-authors and I 
were invited to contribute a white paper2 in anticipation of the meeting, 
sharing our views about the solutions to forced migration from the 
Northern Triangle region of Central America. Each of us had spent 
decades weighing these questions as part of our work as environmental 
justice, labor rights, or human rights lawyers. When we met in the 
highlands of Guatemala in late 2019 to discuss our ideas, it quickly became 
evident that we could not disconnect the conversation about solutions to 
Central American forced migration from the long-term struggles for just 
nations in the region. In our introduction, we explained that we felt 
strongly that our frame for offering solutions had to embrace the 
complexity of forced migration’s root causes, and at least try to take up 
the daunting task of contextualizing these in the century long projects in 
the region of building just nations post-colonization and post-conflict.3 At 
the same time, we also acknowledged that we would do so, despite the 
obvious: that “neither civil wars nor incredible ambitious peace processes 
[had] been terribly successful [in helping] these nations transition to strong 
and just democracies.”4 
At the time we wrote the white paper, we harbored little hope that the 
current political climate, both in the U.S. and in the region, would pay 
much heed to our proposed solutions. This liberated us from 
compromising our convictions and ideas to immediate political 
pragmatism. Instead, we focused on longer-term solutions, which we 
collectively believed could lead Hondurans, Guatemalans, and 
Salvadorans to experience their own nations as viable options to remain 
and lead dignified lives.5 Thus, we titled our paper Connecting Past and 
Present: Central America’s Forced Migration as an Unfinished Project of 
Building Just Nations Post-Conflict and Post-Colonization and provided 
dozens of recommendations grounded in three principles: (1) insisting on 
transnational or international solutions that both take seriously the moral 
 
1 For information about the Border Humanitarian Health Initiative, see BORDER 
HUMANITARIAN HEALTH INITIATIVE, https://www.borderhumanitarianhealth.org (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2021). 
2 See White Papers, BORDER HUMANITARIAN HEALTH INITIATIVE, 
https://www.borderhumanitarianhealth.org/white-papers (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
3 Raquel E. Aldana, Mario René Mancilla & Luis Mogollón, Connecting Past and 
Present: Central America’s Forced Migration as an Unfinished Project of Building Just 
Nations Post-Colonization and Post-Conflict, UC DAVIS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
(Forthcoming). 
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Id. at 18. 
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responsibility of nations like the U.S. to provide real solutions to the region 
and acknowledge the interdependence of issues and solutions to many of 
the problems affecting the region; (2) capitalizing on the promise of local 
governments or indigenous communities to take up important state 
functions—distributional justice, protection of natural resources, and the 
delivery of justice—as well as the role of organized civil society such as 
cooperatives, churches, and other human rights groups to help promote 
sustainable development and systems of public accountability (a broader 
and deeper democracy); and (3) restructuring certain important solutions 
to seemingly intractable challenges in the region—such as land 
redistribution; threats to natural resources; or justice reforms—through the 
lens of human rights and not solely through a private property or tough-
on-crime framework.6 
A year later, the pandemic effects on the region, but also significant 
changes in the political climate, at least in the U.S., lead me to refocus our 
ideas in this essay toward a few more urgent and pragmatic solutions to 
the persistent forced migration challenges in Central America’s Northern 
Triangle that President Joe Biden could undertake in the first two years of 
his administration. This is far from an abandonment of the broader and 
more ambitious project we tried to envision in our white paper pre-
pandemic. Rather, it is intended as a path forward to some of the 
recommendations already contained in the document. The focus will be on 
measures that the U.S. can undertake to help these nations avert the 
enormous humanitarian crisis brought about by the pandemic including 
starvation, a surge in violence, and a rise in extreme poverty—all of which 
are fueling an increase in forced migration from the region.7 In this essay, 
I focus specifically on two measures: (1) stabilizing the flow of 
remittances from the U.S. to the region; and (2) increasing and 
strategically reorienting aid to these nations to the most vulnerable 
communities affected by the pandemic. 
A focus on U.S.-based solutions to problems in the Northern Triangle 
region requires at least some explanation. It is fair to push back on, or at 
least seek a justification for, why this essay should focus on U.S.-based 
solutions at a time when the U.S. is also facing a significant health, 
economic, political and racial justice crisis.8 Foremost, the proposed 
solutions in this essay do not replace the primary responsibility of these 
nations to take up the challenging work of solving their problems. While 
 
6 Id. at 9. 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See Andrew Hammond et al., How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape 
the American Safety Net, 105 MINN. L. REV. 154 (2020); Adam Serwer, The Next 
Reconstruction, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/10/the-next-reconstruction/615475/. 
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insufficient, it is important to note that each of these nations has 
undertaken important pandemic measures that are responsive to these 
challenges.9 Nevertheless, the first principle guiding our proposed 
solutions in the white paper—a focus on transnational or international 
solutions—applies strongly to the proposed measures in this paper. Even 
leaving aside the U.S. moral responsibility to Northern Triangle nations,10 
it makes a great deal of sense that the well-being of Northern Triangle 
nations is also good for the well-being of the U.S. There is always the oft-
provided justification for helping Northern Triangle nations: that doing so 
will help us avert even more forced migrants seeking to make the U.S. 
their home.11 But there are also less obvious or less commonly proffered 
justifications that promote U.S. interests. First, especially in the last forty 
years, large pockets of nationals from these Northern Triangle nations 
have made the U.S. their home, many themselves becoming U.S. citizens 
while many more have U.S.-born children.12 Many have supplied the U.S. 
with needed labor that has included their role as front line workers during 
pandemic.13 We cannot simply dismiss our familial or communal 
connections to these nations as foreign issues that do not affect the well-
being of our own. Second, we live in an interdependent global economy 
and these nations, while small, have been reliable trading partners doing 
 
9 GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD PÚBLICA Y ASISTENCIA SOCIAL, 
Plan para la Prevención, Contención y Respuesta a Casos de Coronavirus (COVID-19) en 
Guatemala [Plan for the prevention, containment and response to cases of Coronavirus in 
Guatemala] (Mar. 2020), https://www.mspas.gob.gt/component/jdownloads/send/486-
plan/3074-coronavirus-covid-19.html; GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS, 
SECRETARIA DE SALUD, Plan para la Contención y Respuesta a Casos de Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) en Honduras [Plan for the containment and response to cases of Coronavirus 
in Guatemala] (Feb. 2020), https://covid19honduras.org/?q=node/31; REPUBLICA DE EL 
SALVADOR EN LA AM. CENT., DIARIO OFICIAL, DECRETO NO. 593.- Estado de Emergencia 
Nacional de Pandemia por COVID-19 [National Pandemic State of Emergency for 
COVID-19] (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.diariooficial.gob.sv/diarios/do-2020/03-
marzo/14-03-2020.pdf. 
10 For a discussion of the U.S. moral responsibility to Northern Triangle nations, see 
Christian Paz, The Biden Doctrine Begins With Latin America, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/joe-biden-foreign-
policy-latin-america/616841/; César Chelada, Why the U.S. Owes Central America, THE 
GLOBALIST (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.theglobalist.com/united-states-trump-central-
america-immigration/. 
11 Jonas Gamso & Farhod Yuldashev, Targeted Foreign Aid and International 
Migration: Is Development-Promotion an Effective Immigration Policy?, 62 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 809, 809–10 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: 
FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4 (2016) (“In our own Hemisphere, the budget requests money to 
strengthen relationships between the United States and our regional neighbors, to address 
the root causes of illegal migration, especially unaccompanied minors from Central 
America, and to bolster Mexico’s enforcement capacity on its southern border”). 
12 See infra Part II.A.1. 
13 Id. 
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business with the U.S.14 They are producers of many products and services 
we consume, but also consumers of many products we send to their 
homes.15 The economic well-being of these nations, thus, is also good for 
our own economic well-being. 
In Part I of this essay, I document what we know about COVID-19’s 
effects on Northern Triangle nations and their likely impact on the push 
factors that propel forced migration northward. In part II.A, I explore the 
role of remittances in the region and discuss the measures that President 
Biden can take up to ensure the sustainability of this important source of 
economic stability to the region. In Part II.B, I discuss the most recent 
history of U.S. foreign aid in the Northern Triangle, contrasting President 
Obama’s policies with President Trump’s policies to inform and also 
contextualize how President Biden might approach foreign aid in the 
region in a time of pandemic and hopefully post-pandemic. 
I.  WE ARE NOT ALL IN THE SAME BOAT 
Barely two months  into the first pandemic shut down, the phrase 
“[w]e are not all in the same boat, but we are in the same storm,” went 
viral on social media, apparently adopted from a much longer poem that 
highlighted how social inequities yielded vastly different experiences.16 
Most certainly the resonance of this phrase had much to do with people’s 
experiences that COVID-19’s effect was markedly different among 
communities based on factors like race, class, and even geography.17 In 
 
14 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CENTRAL 




16 For a story of how this phrase went viral and the full length of the poem’s text, see 
Pragadish Kirubakaran, ‘We Are Not All In The Same Boat . . . ‘ Covid Poster & Poem Win 
Internet: Here’s Their Story, R.REPUBLICWORLD.COM (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/we-are-not-all-in-
the-same-boat-story-behind-viral-post-and-poem.html. 
17 Kaimipono David Wenger, 1200 Dollars and a Mule: COVID-19, the CARES Act, 
and Reparations for Slavery, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. (LAW MEETS WORLD) 204, 206-09 
(2020); Christianna Silva, Why Latinx People Are Hospitalized From COVID-19 at 4 Times 
the Rate of Whites, NPR (July 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
updates/2020/07/01/885923635/why-latinos-are-hospitalized-from-covid-19-four-times-
the-rate-of-white-american; Kim Parker et al., Economic Fallout from COVID-19 
Continues to Hit Lower-Income Americans the Hardest, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-from-covid-19-continues-
to-hit-lower-income-americans-the-hardest/; Bradley Jones & Jocelyn Kiley, The 
Changing Geography of COVID-19 in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2020), 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW 83 
 
the U.S., at least in my own social media bubble, most of the focus on 
disparate suffering was on our domestic U.S. experience. But the phrase 
bears much relevance as well to describe how COVID-19 is impacting 
different nations. 
A July 2020 United Nations (U.N.) report analyzing the pandemic’s 
global economic impact highlighted both what it called a “synchronized 
global crisis,” while at the same time emphasizing the disparate effects of 
this economic precipice on different economies with a focus on Latin 
American and Caribbean nations.18 The report noted, for instance, 
projections for differential shrinkage in economic growth, interestingly 
predicting a greater average percentage of 7% for developed nations in 
contrast to 1.6% for emerging economies.19 Despite this, when decoupling 
the financial dynamics from the drop in economic activities, the report 
makes evident that the resulting effects of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality, as well as the ability to transcend these, would vary 
significantly to disadvantage those living in emerging economies with pre-
existing high levels of poverty, inequality, and poorly functioning 
democracies.20 For the Latin America region as a whole, where most 
nations remain emerging economies, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has predicted that the combination of a stalled informal economy, a 
drop in tourism, capital flights, and climate disruptions will cause the 
region’s largest-ever economic contraction.21 Even more worrisome is the 
U.N. World Food Program’s prediction that “severe food insecurity” in 
the region will quadruple, from 3.4 million to 13.7 million, during 2020.22 
Central America has been disproportionately impacted by COVID-19 
both in terms of the rate of infections and also its economic impact. In 




18 UN ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC), SPECIAL REPORT, 
COVID-19, NO. 5, at 1–4 (July 15, 2020), 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45784/4/S2000470_en.pdf 
[hereinafter ECLAC REPORT]. 
19 Id. at 2. 
20 Id. at 5-12. 
21 Kristalina Georgieva, A Joint Response for Latin America and the Caribbean to 
Counter the COVID-19 Crisis, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/24/sp062420-a-joint-response-for-latin-
america-and-the-caribbean-to-counter-the-covid-19-crisis. 
22 Austin Horn, 14 Million People in Latin America, Caribbean at Risk of Hunger, U.N. 
Report Says, NPR (May 28, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
updates/2020/05/28/864076929/14-million-people-in-latinamerica-caribbean-at-risk-of-
hunger-u-n-report-says. 
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reported an average of 8,202 coronavirus cases per million residents as 
compared to a global average of 3,500.23 
In terms of economic impact for the Central American region, the July 
2020 U.N. Report makes a few important observations. First, it notes that 
unlike other crises that largely affected trade in goods, this pandemic’s 
disparate effect on services has hit the region hard, given its effect on 
tourism and the related service industries, which are a major driver of 
economic activity in the region.24 It further highlights that the expected 
substantial drops in commodity prices, including for products such as 
coffee and sugar, which are large exports for Central America, will 
negatively affect the region in terms of net exports.25 Additionally, the 
report highlights the large drops in remittances as the pandemic’s 
economic woes linger in the U.S., which will especially impact economies 
like those of El Salvador and Honduras whose remittances represent about 
20% of the GDP.26 
Overall, based on estimated effects of an ongoing pandemic, the report 
predicts that El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala will experience drops 
of 9, 8.6 and 4.1 percent in GDP in 2020 respectively.27 All of this, the 
report concludes, will set back most of the Latin American region a decade 
in terms of its economic gains, and the impacts of this will be felt in 
increased unemployment rates and the further deterioration of poverty and 
extreme poverty. For example, in El Salvador, extreme poverty is 
projected to increase from 7.4 to 11.9 percent from 2019 to 2020, whereas 
poverty will increase from 33.7 to 40.2 percent of the population. In 
Guatemala, extreme poverty will go up from 19.8 to 22.7 percent while 
poverty will increase from 48.6 to 51.6 percent of the population. In 
Honduras, where over half of the population already lives in poverty, the 
percentage will increase from 54.8 to 59 percent, whereas extreme poverty 
will rise from 18.7 to 22.2 percent.28 At the same time, inequality will grow 
in the region and will be worse for El Salvador, the country in the Northern 
Triangle that has made the most gains in addressing inequality in recent 
 
23 María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila et al., Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Central 
America Economic Reactivation in a Covid-19 World: Finding Sustainable Opportunities 




24 ECLAC REPORT, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that tourism in Central America was 
down by 35% from the same time the previous year). 
25 Id. at 4. 
26 Id. at 5. 
27 Id. at 9. 
28 Id. at 11. 
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years.29 According to the report, El Salvador’s inequality index will go up 
by as high as 5.9 percentage points whereas Honduras will go up as high 
as 2.9 percentage points and Guatemala as high as 1.9 percentage points.30 
The human impact of all the above economic projections will be 
nothing short of terrible, especially for populations that were already 
vulnerable pre-pandemic. An example of the particular vulnerability of 
Northern Triangle nations is highlighted in a U.N. report which points to 
the countries’ lack of sanitary infrastructure in most rural areas in addition 
to a dearth of access to hospitals and basic healthcare.31 A July 2020 
Oxfam report of the region (and Venezuela) was titled in Spanish “Aqui 
lo que hay es hambre: Hambre y Pandemia en Centroamérica y 
Venezuela” (What you Will Find Here is Hunger: Hunger and Pandemic 
in Central America and Venezuela).32 According to this report, pre-
pandemic, already about 4.5 million persons in what is known as the dry 
corridor in Central America were food insecure and these numbers are just 
getting worse as levels of extreme poverty rise in the region.33 This region 
experienced as much as 20% drops to already meager levels of income due 
to pandemic restrictions and drops in remittances, at the same time that the 
cost of basic staples, such as beans and corn, began to rise.34 A survey of 
forty-one communities in four countries in the dry corridor region found 
that 57% of reported experiencing food insecurity and moderate to severe 
malnutrition.35 In households with women as the head, this figure rose to 
63%.36 
 
29 The World Bank in El Salvador: Overview, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/elsalvador/overview (last updated Oct. 9, 2020) 
(“El Salvador also [recently] became a more equal country in recent years, with the second-
highest level of equality in Latin America and the Caribbean, after Uruguay, on par with 
the world average. Inequality–measured by the Gini coefficient–declined from 0.51 in 2001 
to 0.38 in 2018.”). 
30 ECLAC REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. 
31 UN OFF. FOR COORDINATION HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (UNOCHA), Panorama de las 
Necesidades Humanitarias: El Salvador, Guatemala, y Honduras (Addendum: Impacto De 
La COVID-19) 6 [Overview of Humanitarian Needs: El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras (Addendum: Impact of COVID-19)] (May 2020), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20200616_HNO_CENTROAMERI
CA%20ADDENDUM.pdf. 
32 OXFAM INTERNACIONAL, ‘Aqui lo que hay es hambre’: Hambre y Pandemia en 
Centroamérica y Venezuela [‘Here there is hunger’: Hunger and Pandemic in Central 
America] (July 2020), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Aqu%C3%AD%20lo%20que%20h
ay%20es%20hambre%20Oxfam%20Media%20Brief.pdf. 
33 Id. at 8. The dry corridor runs parallel to the Pacific Coast through parts of Mexico, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Id. 
34 Id. at 9. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 10. 
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Another extremely worrying projection is the effect of COVID-19 on 
insecurity in the region. A November 2020 study titled Virus-Proof 
Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in Mexico and the Northern Triangle 
found that while the pandemic initially slowed down organized crime in 
the region, criminal groups, such as gangs and narcotraffickers, adapted 
quickly to tighten and even expand their control over people and 
territories.37 After the outbreak, street gangs across the Northern Triangle 
advertised themselves as champions of communities under lockdown, 
handing out food baskets and forgiving protection payments.38 Due to 
COVID-19 movement restrictions, violence fell briefly in Honduras and 
Guatemala, but it is now back to or above pre-pandemic levels, while 
extortion rackets in both countries appear set to intensify.39 El Salvador is 
an outlier in that murder rates have stayed close to historical lows for 
reasons that remain disputed.40 Among the most disturbing trends is the 
return to extortions as a primary means of generating revenue and the very 
likely reality of many more recruits who will not have a choice but to join 
gangs as they expand or solidify control over territories profoundly 
impacted by the pandemic.41 
The governments in the Northern Triangle have taken important steps 
to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis generated by the pandemic.42 El 
Salvador, for example, was one of the fastest countries in Central America 
to adopt strong containment measures against  the outbreak and also to 
limit its impact on households and businesses.43 Some of the measures 
included cash transfer to approximately 60% of all households, food 
distribution for low-income households, and a grace period for loan 
repayments, among others.44 These efforts have not been nearly enough, 
have not reached those most in need, or have been plagued by delays, non-
transparency or corruption.45 The Oxfam report describes, however, how 
El Salvador’s measure to give $300 to the most vulnerable resulted in 
 
37 INT’L CRISIS GRP., Virus-Proof Violence: Crime and Covid-19 in Mexico and the 




40 Id. (“The government says its security plan has kept violent gangs at bay, while Crisis 
Group has suggested that gang and government leaders may have struck an informal 
agreement to scale back violence. But, if such a pact exists, neither side has acknowledged 
it in public”) 
41 Id. at 6, 14. 
42 Brizuela de Ávila et al., supra note 23, at 2. In fact, the only country in Central 
America that did not adopt COVID-related measures was Nicaragua. Id. 
43 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 29. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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month long delays due to distributional challenges. In Honduras, the 
approval of a substantial pandemic relief package has been criticized for 
corruption and lack of transparency in the implementation.46 
Given the above, COVID-19 will also affect migration trends and the 
needs of migrants. This already includes numerous cases of migrants 
stranded due to movement restrictions as well as effects on unemployment 
rates and income generation in both countries of origin and residence.47 
Early reports suggested that the pandemic significantly slowed down new 
waves of migration to the U.S.48 However, these trends are likely to be 
temporary. In June 2020, the U.N. International Organization for 
Migration conducted a survey, inter alia, on people who had the intention 
of migrating from Central America prior to the pandemic.49 Survey results 
reveal that the pandemic only delayed people’s intention to migrate, but 
few abandoned their plan to do so in the future.50 Unfortunately, the 
devastation from recent hurricanes in the region51 on top of the pandemic 
is already spurring new waves of desperate migration. According to data 
from Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the number of people 
apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico border has already climbed in six 
straight months, to more than 69,000 in October from 17,000 in April 
2020.52 Sadly but predictably, at the beginning of 2021, a new precarious 
caravan of approximately 2,000 mostly Honduran nationals began their 
journey north and are already facing insurmountable challenges, including 
batons and tear gas from police forces in Guatemala.53 
 
46 OXFAM INTERNACIONAL, supra note 32, at 10. 
47 UN INT’L OFF. FOR MIGRATION (IOM), Effects of COVID-19 on Migrants 6 (June 
2020), https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/surveyeffects_of_covid-
19_june_2020_final.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=9720 [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
48 See, e.g., José de Córdoba & Michelle Hackman, Coronavirus Pandemic Slows Illegal 
Migration to U.S., WALL ST. J. (April 19, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-pandemic-slows-illegal-migration-to-u-s-
11586481423. 
49 IOM REPORT, supra note 47, at 6. 
50 The pandemic affected migration plans for 57% of those surveyed. Among the people 
with the intention of migrating, the highest percentage of people postponed travel due to 
the pandemic (47%). Additionally, only 10% of people changed their minds due to the 
pandemic declaration and no longer wished to migrate. Id. at 15. 
51 See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
52 Michael D. McDonald & Eric Martin, Migrant Caravans Head to U.S. Border in 
Early Test for Biden, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-09/migrant-caravans-head-to-u-s-
border-giving-biden-an-early-test. 
53 Associated Press, Guatemalan forces stall migrant caravan from Honduras with tear 
gas, batons, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2021-01-18/guatemala-forces-stall-migrant-caravan-tear-gas-batons. 
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II. INTERNALIZING SOLUTIONS TO FORCED MIGRATION 
A year ago, in the section of our white paper focused on the U.S.-based 
policy changes needed to address the root causes of the Northern 
Triangle’s forced migration, our recommendations ranged from 
addressing climate change to drug liberalization and immigration and 
trade reforms.54 In this essay, I focus instead on the most pressing and 
viable reforms under a Biden administration that can have the most 
immediate impact on the most urgent humanitarian needs in the region. 
Section A specifically focuses on immigration reforms that a Biden 
administration can undertake without the need for legislation that both 
seek to end practices that are aggravating the health and humanitarian 
crisis and ones that promise to bring greater stability to the Northern 
Triangle region. Days into his confirmation as President, Joe Biden 
pledged to introduce comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) legislation 
within days of taking office that would create a path to legalization to the 
estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S.55 With 
Democrats in control of both chambers of Congress, CIR legislation is 
now a viable political option. Still, this possibility whose outcome is not 
guaranteed and will take time should not deter the Biden administration 
from adopting important measures right away on its own that will not only 
provide urgent need to the Northern Triangle region but can also help to 
pave the way for CIR. For context, prior to the policy recommendations, 
this section provides a brief profile of migrants and recent migration 
patterns from the Northern Triangle region to the U.S. and an explanation 
of the stabilizing role of remittances sent home by these migrants to the 
region. 
Section B then turns to recommendations to increase and shift 
priorities to the U.S. foreign aid that a Biden administration will likely 
send to the region. For context, this section first explains the priorities for 
foreign aid adopted in the second term of President Obama’s 
administration and the changes to these during the Trump Presidency. 
 
54 Aldana et al., supra note 3, at 8-15. 
55 FACT SHEET: President Biden Outlines Steps to Reform Our Immigration System by 
Keeping Families Together, Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration, and 




immigration-syst; Biden Will Introduce Immigration Bill Immediately, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 
8, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2021-01-08/biden-will-introduce-
immigration-bill-immediately-video. 
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A. Why and How U.S. Immigration Reforms Can Aid Recovery in 
the Northern Triangle 
1. A Profile of Northern Triangle Migrants and Immigrants in 
the United States and at the U.S.-Mexico Border 
The Migration Policy Institute’s most recent profile of Central 
American immigrants estimates there are a total of 3.5 million living in the 
U.S., most  from the Northern Triangle region.56 This is not a large share 
of the U.S. immigration population, comprising only around 8% of the 
44.5 million immigrants in 2017.57 However, for these Northern Triangle 
nations, the number of its nationals living abroad, nearly 90% in the U.S., 
as an overall share of their respective populations, the numbers are 
comparatively high. This is especially true for El Salvador which in 2019 
had nearly a quarter of its nationals living abroad, followed by Honduras 
at over 8% and Guatemala at nearly 7%.58 
One notable characteristic of this population is that, comparatively 
speaking, many still remain in the U.S. in uncertain immigration status 
despite their length of stay and their deep ties to this country. 44% of 
Salvadorans,59 33% of Guatemalans,60 and 29% of Hondurans,61 for 
example, have been in the U.S. for over twenty years. Overall, U.S. 
immigrants are in the country legally (77%) with nearly half (45%) being 
naturalized citizens.62 In contrast, only 33% of Salvadorans, 28% of 
Guatemalans and 24% of Hondurans in the U.S. are naturalized citizens63 
while they represent a growing share of U.S. unauthorized immigrants 
 
56 Allison O’Connor et al., Central American Immigrants in the United States, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-
american-immigrants-united-states-2017. 
57 Id. 
58 See Emigrantes Totales [Immigrant Totals], EXPANSIÓN, 
https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/migracion/emigracion (last visited Mar. 11, 
2021). To bring some perspective, Mexico, which is still the largest sender of immigration 
to the United States (24%), has a share of 9.25% of its nationals living abroad. See id. See 
also Emma Israel & Jeanne Batalova, Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-
immigrants-united-states-2019. 
59 Luis Noe-Bustamante et al., Facts on Hispanics of Salvadoran Origin in the United 





62 Abby Budiman, Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-
immigrants/. 
63 O’Connor et al., supra note 56. 
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(around 1.9 million in 2017), most of them from the Northern Triangle 
region.64 They also remain top beneficiaries of programs like Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Action for Early Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA).65 
Another notable characteristic is that Central Americans participate at 
higher rates in the labor force than both the overall foreign and U.S. born 
populations.66 About 72% of Central American immigrants participate in 
the civilian labor force, compared to 66% of the total immigrant 
population and 62% of native-born individuals. Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans in particular had the highest labor force participation rates at 
74% each.67 Moreover, more than a third of all Salvadorans, Guatemalans 
and Hondurans work in service occupations68 and comprise a growing 
proportion of U.S. farmworkers.69 Many, alongside other immigrants, 
became essential workers during the pandemic. A recent study on the role 
of immigrants as essential workers during the COVID-19 pandemic found 
that generally immigrants are over-represented in “essential industries” 
(defined as including agriculture, food, distribution and health) while 
Mexican and Central Americans in particular are disproportionately so.70 
The largest over-representation is in agriculture: unauthorized immigrants 
comprise 22% of agriculture workers in the U.S. and 43% in California. 
Most of the manually intensive, risky jobs in agriculture are performed by 
Mexican and Central American immigrants, who are often undocumented 
and who have continued to keep the U.S. agriculture industry operating 
even in these months of the COVID-19 pandemic.71 Finally, Central 
Americans tend to have lower incomes than overall foreign ($46,000) and 
 
64 Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-
illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/. 




69 Farm Labor, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-
economy/farm-labor (last updated Apr. 22, 2020). 
70 Giovanni Peri & Justin C. Wiltshire, The Role of Immigrants as Essential Workers 
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, UC DAVIS GLOB. MIGRATION CTR., 
https://globalmigration.ucdavis.edu/role-immigrants-essential-workers-during-covid-19-
pandemic (last visited Mar. 12, 2020). See also, e.g., Jose A. Del Real, In an Immigrant 
Community Battling Coronavirus, ‘Essential, Means ‘Vulnerable,’ WASH. POST (May 9, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-an-immigrant-community-battling-
coronavirus-essential-means-vulnerable/2020/05/08/c25cdb4e-8e1e-11ea-a9c0-
73b93422d691_story.html; Donald Kerwin & Robert Warren, US Foreign-Born Workers 
in the Global Pandemic: Essential and Marginalized, 8 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUM. SEC. 
1, 1 (2020). 
71 Peri & Wiltshire, supra note 70. 
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U.S. born individuals ($60,800), with Guatemalans and Hondurans 
earning the lowest incomes at only $43,000 and $40,000 respectively 
according to 2017 data.72 
A third notable characteristic is the recent increase in the number of 
Central Americans, especially from the Northern Triangle region, who are 
seeking asylum in the U.S. or other types of humanitarian relief, such as 
those available to unaccompanied minors. For example, from the Northern 
Triangle region, more individuals affirmatively sought asylum in 2014-
2016 than in the preceding seventeen years combined.73 The number of 
affirmative asylum applications by migrants from Central America’s 
Northern Triangle countries rose from 3,523 in 2012 to 31,066 in 2017, an 
almost 800% increase.74 Unaccompanied children filed the majority of the 
affirmative asylum applications from the Northern Triangle countries, 
making up 66% of the applications in 2015 and 56% in both 2016 and 
2017.75 By 2018, the number of affirmative asylum applications from the 
Northern Triangle saw a sharp decrease of 19%, although unaccompanied 
minors still made up 60% of these applications.76 By 2019, the last year 
for which published data is available, Salvadoran affirmative applications 
showed the greatest decrease by 35% from the previous year, while 
Guatemala and Honduras showed drops of 9% and 8.7% respectively.77 
Again, from these nations, the majority (52%) of filings for asylum came 
from unaccompanied minors.78 
The decrease in affirmative asylum applications in recent years does 
not necessarily mean that fewer Central Americans have been making the 
trek northward hoping to seek asylum or other protections in the U.S. In 
fact, U.S. CBP data shows that Southwest border apprehensions increased, 
substantially so, during the same period that affirmative asylum 
 
72 O’Connor et al., supra note 56. 
73 Nadwa Mossaad & Ryan Baugh, Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2016, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. at 7 (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2016_0.pdf. 
74 Nadwa Mossaad, Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. at 7 (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2017.pdf. 
75 Id. 
76 Nadwa Mossaad, Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. at 6 (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2018/refugees_asylees_2018.pdf. 
77 Ryan Baugh, Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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applications decreased.79 Instead, a more likely explanation for the drop in 
asylum applications from Northern Triangle nationals has to do with the 
significant changes in asylum policies and practices adopted during the 
Trump administration that barred many from applying.80 Moreover, since 
President Trump enacted the Migrant Protection Protocols (also known as 
“Remain in Mexico”) Program, which forces asylum seekers to wait out 
their time to apply for asylum in Mexico, more than 66,000 applicants, 
many of whom remain in makeshift encampments in various parts of 
Mexico, were already part of the program by September 2020.81 
2. The Important of Remittances to the Northern Triangle and 
Its Implications on U.S. Immigration Policy 
Remittances or money that immigrants send back home have played a 
very important role in alleviating poverty, improving nutritional outcomes, 
reducing child labor, and increasing investments in education in middle to 
lower income countries across the globe.82 This is especially true in 
Northern Triangle nations where remittances represent a substantial share 
of these nations’ GDP. In 2019, remittances constituted greater than 20% 
of the GDP in El Salvador and Honduras, and greater than 10% of its GDP 
in Guatemala.83 This represents billions of dollars, most of which flow 
 
79 In fiscal year (FY) 2017, for example, Southwest border apprehensions were 415,517. 
The first year that asylum applications went down, 2018, border apprehensions climbed to 
521,090 and then substantially to 977,090 in 2019. It was only in 2020 that this number 
began to drop but was still higher than in 2017 at 458,088. Southwest Land Border 
Encounters, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration (last updated Mar. 10, 2021). 
80 See Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; 
Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018); Asylum Eligibility 
and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019); Procedures for Asylum 
and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 
36,264 (June 15, 2020); Security Bars and Processing, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,201 (July 9, 2020); 
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 59,692 (Sept. 23, 2020); 
Procedures for Asylum and Bars to Asylum Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 67,202 (Oct. 21, 
2020); Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,260 (Dec. 17, 
2020). 
81 Jasmine Aguilera, Migrants Stranded in Mexico Have 1 Year to File for Asylum. 
COVID-19 Is Making That Deadline Nearly Impossible, TIME (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://time.com/5888791/covid-19-asylum-seekers-mexico/. 
82 World Bank Predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History, THE WORLD 
BANK (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-recent-
history. 
83 Massimo Meccheri, Migración y empleo frente al covid-19: insumos y propuestas 
para un plan de recuperación, reconstrucción social y resiliencia de la región 
centroamericana, EUROSOCIAL [Migration and employment in the face of covid-19: 
inputs and proposals for recovery, social reconstruction and resilience plan for the Central 
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directly into the hands of family members. In 2016, for example, between 
80–85% of the 1.2 million Salvadorans living in the U.S. sent money home 
to the tune of $4.6 billion.84 Between 80–90% of these monies are used to 
pay for basic necessities, such as housing, food, and health care.85 Sadly, 
this means that a reduction in remittances will impact directly the 
livelihoods of families who stop receiving them. At a time of profound 
crisis in the region, the consequences of this will be dire. 
For Latin American nations, 75% of all remittances originate from the 
U.S and around 3 million migrants are expected to lose their jobs as a result 
of the pandemic.86 The World Bank had calculated that due to the effects 
of the pandemic to receiving nations of migration, remittances to the Latin 
American region as a whole will decrease by 19.3% in 2020, the largest 
decline in recent history.87 Especially, in the first sixth months of the 
pandemic, drops in remittances were quite sharp, and especially so for El 
Salvador, which experienced an 8% change from the previous year.88  The 
good news is that these numbers rebounded and did not yield the predicted 
losses by the end of 2020. Latin America overall had a 1% increase in 
remittances in 2020, while the amount sent to Africa and Asia dropped by 
9% and 8% respectively.89 For each of the Northern Triangle nations, 
surprisingly, remittances in 2020 even outperformed those sent in 2019 by 
even higher percentages. Guatemala received remittances of $11.34 
billion, an amount that is 8% higher than the $10.58 billion recorded in 
2019.90 For El Salvador, remittances grew from 2019 by 0.08% to 5.27 for 
 
American region] (Aug. 6, 2020), https://eurosocial.eu/bitacora/migracion-y-empleo-
frente-al-covid-19-insumos-y-propuestas-para-un-plan-de-recuperacion-reconstruccion-
social-y-resiliencia-de-la-region-centroamericana. 
84 Katherine Parks, Remittances to El Salvador Keep Families Out of Poverty, THE 
BORGEN PROJECT (Feb. 12, 2018), https://borgenproject.org/remittances-to-el-salvador/. 
85 See Meccheri, supra note 83. 
86 Mariellen Malloy Jewers & Manuel Orozco, Migrants, Remittances, and COVID-19: 
Remittance Behavior and Economic and Health Vulnerabilities, THE DIALOGUE 4 (Aug. 
2020), https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FINAL-Migrants-
Remittances-and-Covid-19_08.05.20.pdf. 
87 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 82. 
88 For Honduras, the drop was 4.2 percent, for Guatemala, 0.9 percent. Luis Noe-
Bustamante, Amid COVID-19, remittances to some Latin American nations fell sharply in 
April, then rebounded, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/31/amid-covid-19-remittances-to-some-
latin-american-nations-fell-sharply-in-april-then-rebounded/. 
89 Teresa Welsh, Anticipated remittance dive bucked by Latin America and the 
Caribbean, DEVEX (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.devex.com/news/anticipated-remittance-
dive-bucked-by-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-98880. 
90 Guatemala: Remittances Exceed $11 Billion, CENTRALAMERICADATA.COM (Jan. 7. 
2021), https://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Guatemala_Remittances_
Exceed_11_Billion. 
94 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
a total of 5.27 million dollars.91 For Honduras, the growth from 2019 was 
2.8% for a total of $5.65 billion dollars.92 
According to experts, the resilience of U.S. migrants, their devotion to 
families left behind, and their continued employment during the pandemic 
in the front lines in jobs that are considered essential (at grave risks to 
themselves and their families) has meant that remittances have been 
ongoing, including to the Central American region.93 However, the Trump 
administration’s U.S. immigration policies and its terrible response to the 
pandemic, which has left the entire U.S. population vulnerable, threatens 
the ability of Northern Triangle migrants to sustain the enormous 
contributions they make through their monthly sacrifices of sending part 
of what they earn to family who remain. For this reason, the sustainability 
and growth of remittances to the Northern Triangle will both depend on 
the U.S.’s overall economic recovery from COVID-19—which will in turn 
depend on our ability to contain the virus’ spread through mass 
immunization and other measures—and on reversing several immigration 
policies and practices that have affected migrants from the region 
especially during but also prior to the Trump administration. 
The rest of this essay provides recommendations specifically oriented 
to safeguarding and protecting the well-being and security of migrants 
from the Northern Triangle region—not only those who are already here 
but also those who have a right to immigrate based on existing 
immigration laws, including those that recognize family unification and 
our obligations to protect asylum-seekers. 
3. The Immigration Laws, Policies and Practices Affecting 
Northern Triangle Nations that Must Change Immediately 
a. Immigration Detention and Deportation Practices that 
Are Spreading COVID-19 in the Region Must Stop 
Immediately Until the Virus is Controlled 
President Biden has pledged to take up two important changes to 
interior immigration enforcement that, if implemented right, could stop the 
spread of COVID-19 infections to the region based on ongoing detention 
 
91 Tomás Guevara, Aumento de remesas dependerá de situación de empleo en los 
EE.UU., ELSALVADOR.COM [Increase in remittances will depend on employment situation 
in the U.S.] (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.elsalvador.com/eldiariodehoy/aumento-remesas-
dependera-situacion-empleo-estados-unidos/794559/2021. 
92 Victor Estrada, A Pesar de la Crisis for COVID-19, Remesas Incrementaron en 
Honduras, TIEMPO DIGITAL [Despite the COVID-19 Crisis, Remittances Increased in 
Honduras] (Dec. 29, 2020), https://tiempo.hn/remesas-2020-honduras-incrementaron. 
93 Welsh, supra note 89. See also Guevara, supra note 91; Estrada, supra note 92. 
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and deportations of nationals to those countries: (1) end prolonged 
detention and reinvest in a case management program; and (2) restore 
sensible immigration priorities.94 
In July 2020, the New York Times, in collaboration with the Marshall 
Project, released an investigative report documenting how immigration 
detention and deportation practices were becoming spreaders of the 
coronavirus.95 Then, the report highlighted how thousands of immigration 
detainees, many of whom were being transferred from one detention center 
to another, were sick with the virus.96 The report also documented 
deportations, often in secret night flights, of sick detainees back to their 
countries, including nationals from the Northern Triangle.97 
Northern Triangle nations have tried to institute strict quarantine 
measures for those returned; however, those deported are being kept in 
detention centers that are not following health containment guidelines and 
are contributing to the virus’s spread.98 Upon release, deportees are 
significantly stigmatized as carriers of the virus and are generally excluded 
from the already taxed health services available.99 
The pandemic did substantially slow down the number of deportations 
generally and thus also deportations of Northern Triangle nationals. 
According to data from the International Organization on Migration, in 
2019, the U.S. and Mexico together deported 251,778 Central American 
nationals but fewer than 50,000 during the first quarter in 2020.100 But this 
is still insufficient. Especially until COVID-19 is contained, all 
immigration detention practices in the U.S. that are unsafe and 
unnecessary must end and be replaced with cheaper, safer and effective 
monitoring alternatives.101 The American Immigration Council recently 
made the case for ending all immigration detentions noting that during the 
pandemic, the death toll in ICE facilities has been higher than during the 
last fifteen years and also documenting the availability and effectiveness 
 
94 See The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants, 
JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/immigration (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) (hereinafter 
Biden Immigration Plan). 
95 Emily Kassie & Barbara Marcolini, ‘It Was Like a Time Bomb’: How ICE Helped 




98 Int’l Det. Coal., Room for Hope, https://idcoalition.org/covid-19/ 
99 Id. 
100 Meccheri, supra note 83. 
101 See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n et al., The Real Alternatives to Detention (June 
2019), https://justiceforimmigrants.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Real-
Alternatives-to-Detention-June-2019-FINAL-v.2.pdf. 
96 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
of alternatives to detention.102 The U.S. would not be alone in taking such 
measures. In response to COVID-19, at least ten nations across the world 
instituted alternatives to immigration detention.103 
Similarly, Biden should end all deportations to nations that are not 
equipped to contain the virus (and this includes the Northern Triangle) 
until those safeguards are in place. Beyond COVID-19, the Biden 
administration will need to reckon with whether deportation policies in 
place during the Obama administration, which included hundreds of 
thousands of Central Americans,104 resulted in greater harm than good to 
U.S. interests. Significant research has documented the ways in which 
these practices only aggravated insecurity in the region and provoked 
further forced migration north.105 
b. COVID Relief Laws, Policies and Practices Must Protect 
All U.S. Residents Irrespective of Immigration Status 
President Biden ran on a platform distinguishing himself on how his 
administration would prioritize a concerted response to the pandemic. It is 
no surprise that his plan to combat coronavirus is extensive and includes a 
number of important measures, some of which can be implemented 
immediately and some of which will require legislation.106 The plan is 
largely silent on immigration status. The only explicit mention of 
immigration in his plan is when it mentions reversing the public charge 
rule.107 Similarly, while President Biden’s immigration plan explicitly 
mentions increasing labor protections for agricultural workers, it is silent 
on issues of health.108 
 
102 Katie Shepherd, Making the Case for Ending Immigration Detention, IMMIGR. IMPACT 
(Nov. 11, 2020), https://immigrationimpact.com/2020/11/11/end-immigration-
detention/#.X_i7VDSSmUk. 
103 Int’l Det. Coal., Room for Hope 4-6 (Oct. 2020), https://idcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/Covid-19-Briefing-Paper-2020-ENGLISH.pdf. 
104 Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas & Victoria Rietig, Migrants Deported from the United 
States and Mexico to the Northern Triangle: A Statistical and Socioeconomic Profile, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migrants-
deported-united-states-and-mexico-northern-triangle-statistical-and-socioeconomic 
(documenting that between 2010 and 2015, Mexico and the U.S. together deported more 
than one million persons to the Northern Triangle, including 40,000 children). 
105 See, e.g., David Leblang, U.S. Immigration Policy, Deportations, and the Migration 
Boomerang, DUKE CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. (May 10, 2019), 
https://sites.duke.edu/northerntrianglepolicy/2019/05/10/us-immigration-policy-
deportations-and-the-migration-boomerang/. 
106 See The Biden Plan to Combat Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Prepare for Future 
Global Health Threats, JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/covid-plan (last visited Mar. 
12, 2021) (hereinafter The Biden COVID Plan). 
107 Id. 
108 Biden Immigration Plan, supra note 94. 
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On January 14, 2021, President Biden also released the text of his $1.9 
trillion COVID-19 relief bill at the same time that it announced pursuing 
CIR legislation. The COVID-19 bill is extensive and contains three major 
targets: $400 billion for containing spread of COVID-19 and increasing 
vaccine capabilities; over $1 trillion to assist families needing direct 
financial support; and $440 billion in emergency funds for cash-poor small 
businesses and communities.109 Even if adopted, direct assistance to 
families110 is unlikely to be available to immigrants, except those who are 
lawful permanent residents under federal law’s treatment of public 
benefits for immigrants.111 As a result, unless both CIR are adopted, most 
provisions of the COVID-19 legislation will not directly benefit 
immigrants who lack lawful permanent status. Nevertheless, it is quite 
possible that the public health measures to address COVID-19 will (or 
should) have more universal application. As well, emergency funds to 
businesses and communities can free up states to redirect some of their 
own resources to immigrant families left out of federal financial 
assistance. 
A guiding principle of the Biden COVID-19 Plan is to ensure that 
health professionals, and not politicians, make decisions that ensure the 
public health.112 It is imperative that in making these choices, health 
officials are heard in terms of ensuring access to COVID-19 testing, 
vaccinations, and treatment, at a minimum, which the plan guarantees 
should be free and widely available to everyone,113 should also be 
available to migrants, irrespective of immigration status. Immigrants, 
particularly those from Mexico and Central America who lack permanent 
legal status, are uniquely vulnerable to the health impacts of the 
pandemic.114 Immigrants are also concentrated in occupations that are 
 
109 Bo Erickson et al., Biden Unveils $1.9 Trillion Covid Relief Bill, CBS NEWS (Jan. 15, 
2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-covid-relief-bill-stimulus-check/. 
110 Examples of direct financial support to families include a $1400 stimulus check, 
increasing unemployment insurance from $300 to $400 a week and extending coverage to 
September, extending the federal moratorium on evictions until September, and other types 
of relief such as emergency paid leave and utility bill relief. See Jordan Weissmann, Joe 
Biden’s First COVID-Relief Bill Isn’t Screwing Around, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2021), 
https://slate.com/business/2021/01/biden-covid-relief-bill.html. 
111 See Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/immigrantshcr (last updated Jan. 2014); Update on 
Access to Health Care for Immigrants and Their Families, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/update-on-access-to-health-care-for-immigrants-
and-their-families (last updated May 27, 2020); see generally Cori Alonso-Yoder, Publicly 
Charged: A Critical Examination of Immigrant Public Benefit Restrictions, 97 DENV. L. 
REV. 1 (2019). 
112 The Biden COVID Plan, supra note 106. 
113 Id. 
114 Meccheri, supra note 83. 
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suffering massive job losses due to shelter in place mandates or, if 
employed, are experiencing high exposure to COVID-19 when most lack 
the health coverage they need if infected with COVID-19.115 One estimate 
calculates that there are at least 6 million undocumented workers who are 
in frontlines as essential workers.116 Yet, reports on the ground from health 
experts suggest that they are being dangerously left out from basic access 
to COVID-19 testing, vaccination, and health care in ways that threaten 
not only migrants themselves but all U.S. residents.117 
Federal COVID-19 economic relief, which is also urgent, so far has 
left out all migrants who are not lawful permanent residents, with dire 
consequences to themselves but also to the U.S. economy overall.118 In 
fact, the first relief, known as the CARES Act,119 even precluded citizens 
lawfully married to undocumented immigrants from collecting aid.120 In 
response, a handful of states provided their own but limited sources of 
economic relief to migrants, while food pantries and other groups have 
supplied basic necessities.121 Most of the types of federal economic relief 
President Biden identifies in his plan are likely to require legislative action 
but not all (e.g., food relief). At a minimum, President Biden should ensure 
right away that distribution of basic emergency staples, COVID-19 
staples, and vaccinations should be made available to all who need it 
irrespective of immigration status. Beyond this, future pandemic relief 
 
115 Id. See also O’Connor et al., supra note 56. 
116 Lissandra Villa, ‘We’re Ignored Completely.’ Amid the Pandemic, Undocumented 
Immigrants Are Essential But Exposed, TIME (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://time.com/5823491/undocumented-immigrants-essential-coronavirus/. 
117 See id. See also Will Humble, Undocumented immigrants’ lack of access to COVID-
19 testing threatens all of us, AZCENTRAL (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/2020/07/08/undocumented-immigrants-
lack-access-coronavirus-testing-threatens-arizona/5392271002/. 
118 Villa, supra note 116. See also Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda et al., Undocumented During 
COVID-19: Essential for the Economy but Excluded from Relief, UCLA LATINO POL’Y & 
POLS. INITIATIVES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://latino.ucla.edu/research/undocumented-during-
covid-19-essential-for-the-economy-but-excluded-from-relief/. 
119 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. 116-136 
(2020). 
120 Rights Groups Urge Inclusion of Immigrant Families in Coronavirus Relief Bill, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/20/rights-groups-urge-
inclusion-immigrant-families-coronavirus-relief-bill. 
121 Roberto Suro & Hannah Findling, State and Local Aid for Immigrants during the 
COVID-19 Pandemic: Innovating Inclusion, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (July 8, 2020), 
https://cmsny.org/publications/state-local-aid-immigrants-covid-19-pandemic-
innovating-inclusion; Brenda León, Immigrant Woman Starts Food Pantry In Her Home 
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measures, which could be included as part of a CIR bill, should consider 
rectifying the exclusion of unauthorized immigrants from unemployment 
relief or access to health insurance.122 Such measures would help stabilize 
the U.S. economy faster and also help curb the spread of the virus.123 
c. DHS should Restore and Expand TPS for Salvadorans 
and Hondurans and Extend it to Guatemalans 
President Biden’s immigration plan calls for a review of TPS for 
vulnerable populations who cannot return safely to their countries based 
on violence or disaster.124 There are compelling reasons why this review 
should lead the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to immediately 
restore and expand TPS for Salvadorans and extend it to Guatemalans. 
Qualifying nationals from El Salvador and Honduras have been the 
recipients of TPS since 2001 and 1999 respectively.125 Since 1990, 
Congress authorized the immigration agencies, a power that today rests 
with the U.S. DHS, to offer temporary protection to nationals of a foreign 
country due to certain conditions which temporarily prevent the country’s 
nationals from returning safely.126 TPS designation lasts for an initial 
period of six to eighteen months, upon notice in the federal register.127 
Timely extensions are possible and require review and consultation with 
the appropriate agencies to ensure the conditions for such designation 
continue to be met.128 
Honduras, alongside Nicaragua, were originally granted TPS in 1999 
based on Hurricane Mitch’s devastation to the region in 1998, which also 
deeply damaged Guatemala.129 El Salvador would receive TPS a few years 
 
122 Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, Vulnerable to COVID-19 and in Frontline Jobs, 
Immigrants Are Mostly Shut Out of U.S. Relief, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 4, 2020), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/covid19-immigrants-shut-out-federal-relief. 
123 See, e.g., Hinojosa-Ojeda, et al., supra note 118, at 14-16 (documenting the economic 
benefits of including undocumented workers in pandemic economic relief measures). 
124 Biden Immigration Plan, supra note 94. 
125 See Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: El Salvador, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-
status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-honduras (last updated Dec. 7, 
2020); Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Honduras, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-
status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-el-salvador (last updated Dec. 7, 
2020). 
126 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). 
127 Id. at § 1254a(b)(2). 
128 Id. at § 1254a(b)(3)(A). 
129 Sergio Morales Roda, TPS: la larga historia de solicitudes fallidas que Guatemala ha 
hecho a EE. UU., PRENSA LIBRE [TPS: Guatemala’s Long History of Failed Applications 
to the U.S.] (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/migrantes/tps-la-
larga-historia-de-solicitudes-fallidas-que-guatemala-ha-hecho-a-ee-uu. 
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later in 2001 based on an earthquake that devastated the nation.130 The 
designations offered protection only to certain eligible nationals from 
these countries131 who apply every time the benefit is offered and who are 
not disqualified based on inadmissibility grounds132 such as certain 
criminal convictions.133 The largest group has been Salvadorans at nearly 
250,000 recipients, followed by Honduras at 67,000 recipients. 
Regrettably to many, especially Guatemalans, Guatemala’s then 
President Álvaro Arzú refused to seek the benefit for its nationals when it 
was available.134 Indeed, Guatemalan Presidents have attempted no fewer 
than five times, as have even members of the U.S. Congress, to seek TPS 
protections for Guatemalans, based on natural disasters that have justified 
the extension of the benefit to the other three Central American nations.135 
In contrast, until President Trump took office, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
El Salvador had been successfully maintaining uninterrupted TPS status 
justified largely by the recognition of ongoing instability in the region 
based on new crises but also on how much TPS holders were contributing 
to stability in the region through remittances.136 Then, in 2017, DHS 
 
130 Designation of El Salvador Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 
14214,14215 (Mar. 9, 2001). 
131 Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US 
Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 J. ON 
MIGRATION AND HUM. SEC. 577, 578–79 (2017) (explaining that to apply for TPS, 
Salvadorans must have arrived and been living continuously in the US prior to February 
13, 2001 and Hondurans prior to December 30, 1998). 
132 Section 212 of the INA specifies broad grounds on which foreign nationals are 
considered ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States. 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Section 244(c)(2) in the TPS 
statute lists which of these grounds of inadmissibility may be waived and which may not 
be waived. 
133 According to the regulations, conviction of a felony or two or more misdemeanors 
committed in the United States will disqualify one from TPS. Jose Magaña-Salgado et al., 
Comparison of Criminal and Inadmissibility Grounds for American Dream and Promise 




134 See Morales Roda supra note 129. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. Nicaragua’s TPS status was renewed 13 times, mostly based on subsequent 
droughts and other natural disasters. See Extension of Designation of Nicaragua Under 
Temporary Protected Status Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,440 (May 11, 2000); Extension of 
the Designation of Nicaragua Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 
23,271 (May 8, 2001); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua Under the Temporary 
Protected Status Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,454 (May 3, 2002); Extension of the 
Designation of Nicaragua Under Temporary Protected Status Program; Automatic 
Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Nicaraguans, 68 Fed. Reg. 
23,748 (May 5, 2003); Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for 
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Nicaragua; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for 
Nicaragua TPS Beneficiaries, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,088 (Nov. 3, 2004); Extension of the 
Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua; Automatic Extension of 
Employment Authorization Documentation for Nicaragua TPS Beneficiaries, 71 Fed. Reg. 
16,333 (Mar. 31, 2006); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary 
Protected Status; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for 
Nicaraguan TPS Beneficiaries, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,534 (May 29, 2007); Extension of the 
Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,138 (Oct. 1, 
2008); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status and 
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Nicaraguan TPS 
Beneficiaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,737 (May 5, 2010); Extension of the Designation of 
Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status and Automatic Extension of Employment 
Authorization Documentation for Nicaraguan TPS Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,493 
(Nov. 4, 2011); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 
78 Fed. Reg. 20,128 (Apr. 3, 2013); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for 
Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,176 (Oct. 16, 2014); Extension of the 
Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,325 (May 16, 
2016). El Salvador’s TPS status was renewed 11 times also based on new natural disasters. 
See Extension of the Designation of El Salvador Under the Temporary Protected Status 
Program; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for 
Salvadorans, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,000 (July 11, 2002); Extension of the Designation of El 
Salvador Under Temporary Protected Status Program; Automatic Extension of 
Employment Authorization Documentation for El Salvador, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,071 (July 16, 
2003); Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador; 
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for El Salvador TPS 
Beneficiaries, 70 Fed. Reg. 1450 (Jan. 7, 2005); Extension of the Designation of 
Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador; Automatic Extension of Employment 
Authorization Documentation for El Salvadorian TPS Beneficiaries, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,637 
(June 15, 2006); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected 
Status; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Salvadoran 
TPS Beneficiaries, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,649 (Aug. 21, 2007); Extension of the Designation of 
El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,128 (Oct. 1, 2008); Extension 
of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status and Automatic Extension 
of Employment Authorization Documentation for Salvadoran TPS Beneficiaries, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 39,556 (July 9, 2010); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary 
Protected Status and Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation 
for Salvadoran TPS Beneficiaries, 77 Fed. Reg. 1710 (Jan. 11, 2012); Extension of the 
Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 78 Fed. Reg. 32,418 (May 30, 
2013); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 80 
Fed. Reg. 893 (Jan. 7, 2015); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary 
Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,645 (July 8, 2016). Honduras’s TPS status was renewed 
14 times also based on new natural disasters. See Extension of Designation of Honduras 
Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,438 (May 11, 2000); 
Extension of the Designation of Honduras Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 
66 Fed. Reg. 23,269 (May 8, 2001); Extension of the Designation of Honduras Under the 
Temporary Protected Status Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,451 (May 3, 2002); Extension of 
the Designation of Honduras Under Temporary Protected Status Program; Automatic 
Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Hondurans, 68 Fed. Reg. 
23,744 (May 5, 2003); Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for 
Honduras; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for 
Honduras TPS Beneficiaries, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,084 (Nov. 3, 2004); Extension of the 
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sought to end TPS protections for Nicaraguans137 and similarly for 
Hondurans138 and Salvadorans in 2018.139 In each instance, DHS focused 
solely on whether or not the circumstances that warranted the original 
designation were ongoing and not on the cumulative factors that led prior 
administrations to renew TPS for each of these nations over several 
years.140 DHS also highlighted significant improvement in the overall 
economic and social and security conditions in these countries, even as it 
also acknowledged the few opportunities that TPS recipients would have 
if returned.141 
Litigation ensued to prohibit DHS from terminating TPS for El 
Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan, which is still pending but likely 
not for long in ways that favor the government. On September 14, 2020, a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated an 
injunction prohibiting DHS from terminating TPS for El Salvador, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, and Sudan.142 However, because the appellate court has not 
issued its directive to the district court to make that ruling effective, the 
injunction remains in place at this time.143 For this reason, until the 
 
Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Honduras; Automatic Extension of 
Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduras TPS Beneficiaries, 71 Fed. Reg. 
16,328 (Mar. 31, 2006); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary 
Protected Status; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for 
Honduran TPS Beneficiaries, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,529 (May 29, 2007); Extension of the 
Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,133 (Oct. 1, 
2008); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status and 
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduran TPS 
Beneficiaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,734 (May 5, 2010); Extension of the Designation of 
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status and Automatic Extension of Employment 
Authorization Documentation for Honduran TPS Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,488 (Nov. 
4, 2011); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 78 
Fed. Reg. 20,123 (Apr. 3, 2013); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary 
Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,170 (Oct. 16, 2014); Extension of the Designation of 
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,331 (May 16, 2016); Extension 
of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,630 (Dec. 
15, 2017). 
137 Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 59,636, 59,637 (Dec. 15, 2017). 
138 Termination of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 26,074 (June 5, 2018). 
139 Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 83 
Fed. Reg. 2654 (Jan. 18, 2018). 
140 See Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 
supra note 138; Termination of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected 
Status, supra note 139; Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary 
Protected Status, supra note 140. 
141 Id. 
142 Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). 
143 Id. 
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injunction is lifted permanently, DHS has temporarily continued to extend 
TPS protections to all countries whose status it sought to end, including 
Honduras, even though it was not named in the original litigation.144 A 
large reason for its decision is that the TPS statute also provides that 
“[t]here is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with 
respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of 
a foreign state under this subsection.”145 Thus, DHS under a new President 
and a new Secretary can undo DHS’s decision to end TPS for these 
nations. 
There are several reasons why Biden’s DHS Secretary, Alejandro 
Mayorkas,146 can and should consider not simply reversing the prior 
administration’s decisions to end TPS for Salvadorans and Hondurans but 
issue expanded TPS protections to Salvadorans, Hondurans, and 
Guatemalans. Legally, DHS has broad discretion to grant TPS based on 
factors that are easily satisfied by these nations. The levels of generalized 
violence these nations have experienced and continue to experience 
surpass the violence experienced in many countries to which the label civil 
war has been more easily applied.147 However, it is probably legally and 
politically more viable to continue to focus on environmental disasters in 
the region that are substantial but temporary in nature and that can include 
floods, drought, and epidemics148 or based on extraordinary and temporary 
conditions that prevent the safe return of its nationals to their country. 
 
144 See Temporary Protected States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated Mar. 11, 
2021). 
145 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). 
146 Alejandro Mayorkas, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/person/alejandro-mayorkas (last updated Feb. 11, 2021). 
147 Amelia Cheatham, Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northern-
triangle (last updated Oct. 1, 2019). Scholars have called for a rethinking of the application 
of the armed conflict or civil war label narrowly given the nature of violence that plague 
today’s nation states. See, e.g., Megan Meyer & Simon Stacey, Civil Society, Violence and 
War, INT’L ENCYC. OF CIV. SOC’Y (Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler eds., 2009). 
148 The TPS statute authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate foreign 
countries for TPS “after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government” and 
“only if” the Secretary finds one or more of the following criteria met: “(A) . . . that there 
is an ongoing armed conflict within the state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return 
of aliens who are nationals of that state to that state (or to the part of the state) would pose 
a serious threat to their personal safety; (B) . . . that— (i) there has been an earthquake, 
flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a 
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected, (ii) the 
foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens 
who are nationals of the state, and (iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation 
under this subparagraph; or (C) . . . that there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions 
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Part I of this essay provides documentation that strongly supports the 
renewal and extension of TPS status to all Northern Triangle nationals in 
the U.S. today based on COVID-19’s cumulative and substantial impact 
on the region. In addition to this, while the U.S. was mostly focused on 
our Presidential elections, Category 4 Hurricane storms ETA and IOTA 
devastated the region even more with the hardest hit areas including El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.149 According to the U.N. 
International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), nearly 9.3 million people, 
including 3.5 million children, were affected by the storms and thousands 
of people remain in shelters, facing heightened risks to their health and 
safety.150 Oxfam reports are even worse, estimating that so far 11 million 
people have been affected throughout the region, with 800,000 evacuated 
from their communities.151 The scale of the damage is drawing 
comparisons, in fact, to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which became the basis 
for granting TPS protections to Hondurans and Nicaraguans originally.152 
UNICEF and other donors have been trying to provide as much 
humanitarian aid as quickly as possible but they admit that it is nowhere 
near enough given the scale of the damage and the fact that floodwaters 
are expected to last another six months.153 Damaged water systems and 
other critical infrastructure will need to be rehabilitated while hundreds of 
schools will have to be rebuilt.154 This, on top of the enormous pandemic-
related challenges these nations were already facing, have completely 
overwhelmed the ability of these nations to recover.155 
Beyond the ample legal and humanitarian grounds for renewing and 
expanding TPS to the entire Northern Triangle, the new DHS Secretary 
must weigh the costs of stripping TPS from the estimated 325,000 Central 
American TPS holders (including Nicaraguans) who have had the status 
 
in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the 
state in safety . . . “ 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). 
149 Maryanne Murray Buechner, Long Road Ahead for Hurricane Recovery in Central 
America, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/unicefusa/2021/01/07/long-
road-ahead-for-hurricane-recovery-in-central-america. See also Sylva Mathema & Tom 
Jawetz, TPS Can Promote Stability and Recovery for Central American Countries Hit by 
Recent Hurricanes, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 21, 2020), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/12/18101139/CentralAmericaTPS
-brief.pdf. 
150 UNICEF, CENTRAL AMERICA: HURRICANES ETA AND IOTA, HUMANITARIAN 
SITUATION REPORT NO.6 (Dec. 21, 2020), 
https://www.unicef.org/media/89736/file/UNICEF-Central-America-Humanitarian-
Situation-Report-No.-6-(-Hurricanes-Eta-and-Iota-)-10-21-December-2020.pdf. 
151 Mathema & Jawetz, supra note 149. 
152 Id. 
153 Buechner, supra note 149. 
154 Id. 
155 Mathema & Jawetz, supra note 149, at 4-7. 
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for at least two decades.156 This population is well-established in the U.S. 
and is making significant contributions to our nation. 22% of TPS holders 
from these three nations arrived in the U.S. under the age of sixteen while 
an estimated 273,000 of them have U.S. born citizen children.157 Their 
labor force participation, ranging from 81–88%, is well above the overall 
U.S. population (63%) and the foreign born population as whole (66%).158 
They work in jobs that are essential to the economic recovery of our nation 
during and post-pandemic.159 Several recent studies calculate the losses 
that could result from ending TPS and removing its beneficiaries to the US 
economy in the billions of dollars.160 
Finally, TPS holders also make significant remittances contributions 
to their family members back home and contribute enormously to the 
stability of the region. A study of Salvadoran TPS holders and remittances 
found that between 80–85% among them still send money home, which 
amounts to about $600 million annually.161 Of course, this figure could be 
greater if the U.S. extends TPS to all Salvadorans, Guatemalans and 
Hondurans residing in the U.S. as of November 2020, the dates of the most 
recent hurricanes. These numbers could be as high as 1.8 million 
persons.162 This is a population that is already likely employed and already 
sending remittances home.163 However, several economic studies show 
 
156 Warren & Kerwin, supra note 131, at 577. 
157 Id. at 577-78. 
158 Id. at 577. 
159 The five leading industries in which TPS beneficiaries from these countries work are: 
construction (51,700), restaurants and other food services (32,400), landscaping services 
(15,800), child day care services (10,000), and grocery stores (9,200). Id. See also Workers 




160 See id. at 6-7. 
161 Nurith Aizenman, What You May Not Realize About the End of TPS Status for 
Salvadorans, NPR (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/01/09/576583550/what-you-may-not-
realize-about-the-end-of-tps-status-for-salvadorans. 
162 See Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2021) (estimating that there are 750,000 unauthorized Salvadorans, 
588,000 unauthorized Guatemalans, and 402,000 unauthorized Hondurans in the United 
States). 
163 See generally id. See also Erica Williams et al., Inclusive Approach to Immigrants 
Who are Undocumented Can Help Families and States Prosper, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-
tax/inclusive-approach-to-immigrants-who-are-undocumented-can-help. 
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that legalization measures, even temporary ones, result in higher earnings 
for the beneficiaries and more taxes (and remittances) for communities.164 
d. DACA’s Extension Will Also Help Many Young 
Dreamers from Northern Triangle Nations 
President Biden’s immigration plan includes a strongly worded 
promise to dreamers to seek protections for them and their families more 
permanently while supporting their access to higher education.165 
President Biden is already poised to fulfill this promise with this newly 
introduced CIR.166 Until CIR is adopted, however, President Biden can do 
a lot to improve the plight of DACA recipients. President Biden’s plan 
also included a promise to restore DACA protections to new applicants 
while facilitating renewals, which had been slowed down or halted when 
President Trump moved to end the program,167 a move the US Supreme 
Court blocked in June 2020.168 In response, DHS issued a memorandum 
explaining that new applications for DACA would not be accepted and 
that renewals would be limited to one year instead of two amid an ongoing 
review.169 However, in response to a December 2020 federal district court 
 
164 See, e.g.,The Economic Effects of Administrative Action on Immigration, EXEC. OFF. 
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 2 (Nov. 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_2014_economic_effect
s_of_immigration_executive_action.pdf; FACT SHEET: The Economic Benefits of Fixing 
our Broken Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 21, 2014), 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/21/fact-sheet-economic-benefits-fixing-
our-broken-immigration-system; Patrick Oakford & Philip E. Wolgin, The Economic and 
Fiscal Benefits of Deferred Action, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 21, 2014), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2014/11/21/102041/the-
economic-and-fiscal-benefits-of-deferred-action; Jack Strauss, Allies, Not Enemies: How 
Latino Immigration Boosts African American Employment and Wages, IMMIGR. POL’Y 
CTR. (June 2013), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/allies_not_enem
ies.pdf. 
165 Biden Immigration Plan, supra note 94. 
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Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,” 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0728_s1_daca-reconsideration-
memo.pdf 
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order,170 DHS is already mandatorily fulfilling Biden’s promise of 
allowing new DACA applicants and restoring renewals to a two year 
benefit.171 
Since 2012, more than 825,000 persons brought to the U.S. as children 
have benefited from DACA and thousands more will do so now that new 
applications are open.172 Mexico is by far the top country of origin for 
active DACA recipients (around 80%), and it is followed by the three 
Northern Triangle nations who combined account for more than 60,000 
recipients.173 DACA’s effect as a powerful engine of social mobility is 
well documented,174 as are the significant economic contributions that 
DACA recipients make,175 including as frontline health workers during the 
pandemic.176 
e. President Biden Must End the Trump Administration’s 
Illegal Treatment of Asylum Seekers at the U.S.-Mexico 
Border and Redress the Health and Humanitarian Chaos 
Created by these Policies and Practices 
President Biden’s Immigration Plan pledges to end in his first 100 
days in office both  President Trump’s detrimental asylum policies and the 
mismanagement of the asylum system that has created violence and chaos 
at the border.177 Much has been written about the ways in which the Trump 
administration transformed immigration law,  including by substantially 
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4, 2020) 
171 Update: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 7, 
2020) https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/12/07/update-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals. 
172 Nicole Prchal Svajlenka & Philip E. Wolgin, What We Know About the Demographic 
and Economic Impacts of DACA Recipients: Spring 2020 Edition, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
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restricting asylum protections.178 To do so, the Trump administration 
relied on executive orders, agency decisions, bilateral agreements with 
other nations, and even formal rulemaking.179 Combined, the efforts 
revealed a sophisticated and targeted strategy to create insurmountable 
immediate barriers to deny those arriving at the U.S.–Mexico border, most 
from Northern Triangle nations, the ability to successfully file for asylum. 
These measures included, for example, the so-called “Remain in Mexico 
program”,180 the “Safe Third Country Agreements” with Central American 
nations,181 and the “metering” of asylum applications at the border.182 It 
was also, however, a sophisticated longer-term strategy to end asylum 
protections to most persons escaping the types of violence they 
experienced in Northern Triangle nations, including domestic or gang-
related violence. This became particularly evident in the proposed June 15, 
2020 asylum regulations.183 
Dozens of lawsuits in federal court challenged these policies,184 
including ones targeting the June 15 regulation.185 A California federal 
district court, in fact, blocked the June 15 regulation three days before it 
was due to come into effect.186 Nonetheless, Trump’s efforts have been 
extremely effective. In addition to data that shows a drop in asylum 
 
178 See, e.g., Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. 
Immigration System: A Catalogue of Changes During the Trump Presidency, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (July 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-
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181 Peniel Ibe, The dangers of Trump’s “safe third country” agreements in Central 
America, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (July 28, 2020), https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-
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applications from Northern Triangle applicants,187 more than 20,000 
asylum applicants still await their turn to apply for asylum at various 
Mexican border towns, some for as long as two years, despite horrific 
conditions and perilous circumstances.188 A December 2020 Human 
Rights First Report further documented that thousands of asylum seekers, 
including unaccompanied minors, are being illegally expelled without the 
opportunity to apply for asylum.189 President Biden recognizes that while 
reversal of the Trump asylum policies must be immediate, resolving the 
humanitarian crisis at the border and the chaos created to the asylum 
system will take time and resources. President Biden’s plan, for example, 
calls for working with a network of organizations, such as faith-based 
shelters, non-governmental aid organizations, legal non-profits, and 
refugee assistance agencies who will need federal resources to solve the 
humanitarian crisis at the border.190 This approach makes a great deal of 
sense and should remain a top priority for the Biden administration. 
A significant challenge President Biden faces is how quickly and 
where to relocate the thousands of asylum seekers subjected to the remain 
in Mexico policy. Ideally, given length and inhumane conditions endured 
by this population in Mexico, the Biden Administration will move swiftly 
to adjudicate their asylum petitions safely from within the U.S. Ideally, 
asylum seekers can be tested for COVID-19 and quarantined to follow 
public health guidelines. Many asylum seekers have family members in 
the U.S. ready and willing to host them.191 For those who do not have 
sponsors, shelters or hotels could be used as temporary housing for asylum 
seekers.192 These alternatives are much better than the current status quo—
crowded and largely abandoned encampments—which are sites of 
COVID-19 community transmission not only in Mexico but across the 
border into the U.S.193 
 
187 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
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f. Biden Must Review Immediately the Necessity and 
Effectiveness of a Ban on all Lawful Permanent 
Immigration to the United States as a COVID-19 Safeguard 
In October 2020, the CATO Institute issued a report documenting the 
substantial decline in legal immigration to the U.S., particularly in the 
second half of 2020.194 “Overall,’ the report noted, ‘the second half of FY 
2020 saw 92% fewer immigrants from abroad than the first half, which 
was larger than any annual decline in the history of the U.S.”195 Much of 
the drop in numbers can be attributed directly to travel restrictions that 
President Trump imposed on all legal immigration starting in April 2020 
in response to COVID-19,196 restrictions that, based on a recent extension 
by President Trump, are scheduled to remain in effect until March 2021.197 
However, the decline in numbers began prior to the pandemic due to 
earlier policies directed at refugees and asylum seekers.198 Another 
important fact is that, unlike permanent immigration, most other travel to 
the U.S., including for tourism, was reopened as of July 2020 based on 
economic concerns, despite the pandemic.199 Thus, while travel by 
temporary immigrants, including for tourism, dropped by more than half 
from the previous year, the U.S. State Department still reports over 4 
million admissions of temporary immigrants in 2020.200 In January 2020, 
the only travel restrictions for most temporary visitors applied only to a 
few nations, namely China, Iran, Ireland, Brazil, and those in the United 
Kingdom and in the European Schengen area.201 
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Travel restrictions are most certainly legitimate ways to curtail the 
spread of a global pandemic.202 Indeed, most nations in the world have at 
some point adopted travel restrictions in response to COVID-19.203 U.S. 
travel restrictions adopted under the Trump administration as a response 
to COVID-19, however, raise legitimate questions of motivation, lack of 
consistency, necessity, and effectiveness.204 Moreover, travel restrictions, 
when imposed, should consider whether the health gains outweigh the 
profound impact on the U.S. economy, family reunification, and 
humanitarian concerns, to name a few. From the Northern Triangle region, 
for example, the majority of migration is based on family unification.205 
Given the socio-economic impacts of banning permanent immigration, the 
U.S. should also consider whether alternative safety measures, such as 
requiring testing and quarantine, can work to ameliorate the impacts of 
travel bans.206 Other nations are doing this with promising results.207 
 
202 Chad R. Wells et al., Impact of International Travel and Border Control Measures on 
the Global Spread of the Novel 2019 Coronavirus Outbreak, 117 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, 7504-7509 (2020) (“Our results show that these [border 
control] measures likely slowed the rate of exportation from mainland China to other 
countries, but are insufficient to contain the global spread of COVID-19. With most cases 
arriving during the asymptomatic incubation period, our results suggest that rapid contact 
tracing is essential both within the epicenter and at importation sites to limit human-to-
human transmission outside of mainland China”). 
203 Phillip Connor, More than Nine-in-Ten People Worldwide Live in Countries with 
Travel Restrictions Amid COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/01/more-than-nine-in-ten-people-
worldwide-live-in-countries-with-travel-restrictions-amid-covid-19/. 
204 Wells et al., supra note 202. See also Michele Heisler & Joanna Naples-Mitchell, The 
United States is Using COVID-19 to Abandon Asylum Seekers at the Border, PHYSICIANS 
FOR HUM. RTS. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://phr.org/our-work/resources/the-united-states-is-
using-covid-19-to-abandon-asylum-seekers-at-the-border/; Natalie Banulescu-Bogdan et 
al., Coronavirus Is Spreading Across Borders, But It Is Not a Migration Problem, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INSTITUTE (Mar. 2020),  
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/coronavirus-not-a-migration-problem. 
205 JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RSH. SERV., R45489, RECENT MIGRATION TO THE UNITED 
STATES FROM CENTRAL AMERICA: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45489.pdf. 
206 Mateo Chinazzi et al., The Effect of Travel Restrictions on the Spread of the 2019 
Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak, 368 SCIENCE MAG. 395 (2020), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/368/6489/395.full.pdf. 
207 See, e.g., Hillary Leung, Asia is Slowly Beginning to Reopen Travel. Here’s What the 
World Could Learn, TIME (May 12, 2020, 6:53 AM), https://time.com/5832022/asia-
reopen-travel-coronavirus/. 
112 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
B. How U.S. Reforms to U.S. Foreign Aid Can Aid Recovery in the 
Northern Triangle 
1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Northern Triangle Nations: From 
Obama to Trump 
Especially in recent decades, as Central America became a major 
transit corridor of illicit drugs into the U.S. and also the biggest sender of 
forced migration, U.S. policy makers sought to increase aid to the 
region.208 While there is general agreement that aid should advance U.S. 
interests in stopping or reducing flows of illicit drugs and unauthorized 
migrations from the region, more divisions arise on how to achieve these 
aims through U.S. aid. Disagreements have ranged, for example, on 
whether funding should focus on tough law and order measures targeting 
illicit groups or migrants versus longer-term approaches that seek to 
strengthen the rule of law (i.e., anti-corruption or anti-impunity measures) 
or to address poverty through trade and other economic development 
policies or creating alternatives to incarceration as a way of reintegrating 
illicit groups into society.209 These differences were visible especially 
during the Obama and Trump administrations as described below. 
In 2014, President Obama approved a new government strategy for 
engagement in Central America, viewing the increased investment and the 
new approach to be in the best interest of the U.S.210  U.S. efforts over the 
past 20 years had generally emphasized a single objective, such as 
economic growth or crime reduction. In contrast, President Obama 
grounded his strategy on the premise that prosperity, security, and 
governance are “mutually reinforcing and of equal importance.”211 
With congressional support, the Obama administration launched the 
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which took a more 
comprehensive approach than previous U.S. initiatives in Central 
America, based on the premise that efforts to promote prosperity, improve 
security, and strengthen governance are mutually reinforcing and of equal 
importance. The new strategy, which was also deeply influenced by 
Congress, did not completely abandon security strategies aimed at 
disrupting networks of drug flows. These did, however, expand to include 
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strengthening the capacity of domestic justice sector institutions to 
prosecute organized crime while also supporting community-based and 
violence prevention efforts in the region.212 The Obama administration’s 
new strategy sought “the evolution of an economically integrated Central 
America that is fully democratic; [the provision of] economic 
opportunities to its people . . . more accountable, transparent, and effective 
institutions; and ensur[ing] a safe environment for its citizens.” 
Under President Obama, and with congressional support, aid to the 
region doubled.213 Since 2016, Congress appropriated more than $3.6 
billion toward Obama’s new strategy, allocating the money relatively 
evenly between programs focused on good governance, economic growth, 
and social welfare and Central America Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI) programs intended to prevent violence, reform justice-sector 
institutions, and combat gangs and organized crime.214 In addition, 
Congress imposed strict conditions on the aid to address a number of 
concerns, including border security, human rights, and corruption.215 U.S. 
agencies allocated the vast majority of the aid to the Northern Triangle 
countries.216 
Initially, President Trump maintained President Obama’s foreign aid 
strategy in the region. This all changed in March 2019, less than two years 
into the strategy’s on-the-ground implementation due to President 
Trump’s frustration over the continued flow of forced migration from the 
region to the U.S.217 Over the course of 2019, the Trump administration 
repurposed $396 million of aid away from the Northern Triangle and 
toward other foreign priorities, while at the same time negotiating the so-
called safe third party country agreements with these nations.218 The 
Trump administration also sought to scale back U.S. assistance to Central 
America. Congress rejected some of the Administration’s proposed 
reductions, but annual appropriations for the region declined by nearly 
30% since FY 2016.219 The Trump administration’s decision to cut off aid 
to the region undermined significant progress in the implementation of 
programs designed to alleviate poverty.220 
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Then, in October 2019, after Northern Triangle nations signed the 
migration agreements, the Trump administration announced it would 
restore aid to the region.221 In June 2020, the Trump administration 
communicated its intent to Congress to release more than $705 million of 
new and previously suspended assistance, planning to focus on advancing 
U.S. national security interests, the implementation of the migration 
agreements, and addressing COVID-19 and other humanitarian needs in 
the region.222 Trump’s 2021 budget request also included a request of 
nearly $337 million for all of Central America, conditioned for Northern 
Triangle nations based on compliance with their migration agreements.223 
In December 2020, as part of the second COVID-19 stimulus package 
adopted by Congress during the Trump administration, Congress imposed 
new restrictions on military aid aimed to target corruption and concerns 
over authoritarianism in El Salvador.224 
2. Assessing Effectiveness 
There isn’t consensus on how the effectiveness of foreign aid in the 
region should be measured, even by the U.S. government. To the Trump 
administration, the only metric that mattered for assessing success was the 
reduction in flows of forced migrants from the Central American region to 
the U.S.225 In contrast, other administrations or congressional entities have 
considered longer-term metrics that include efforts to end impunity (e.g., 
the number of prosecutions); anti-corruption efforts; drops in violence; 
and sustained economic growth.226 In this regard, although some early 
signs pointed to good progress flowing from the Obama administration’s 
strategy for engaging in Central America,227 data is insufficient given the 
strategy’s abrupt interruption by the Trump administration; its longer-term 
projections for measuring change; and, now, of course, the effects of the 
pandemic and hurricanes to any gains that may have been achieved in the 
region.228 
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Despite good measures of success, U.S. congressional studies began 
to document the ways in which the Obama Administration’s new strategy 
had started to build an infrastructure that could, with sustained efforts and 
investments, bring more lasting change to the region. Some of these 
changes, for example, included efforts to improve trade in the region by, 
inter alia, strengthening the capacity of regional and local trade 
organizations to promote better trade policies and practices; improve 
customs and border management; diversify and reduce electricity 
production and costs; and promote new sources of green energy.229 Efforts 
also focused on reducing food insecurity and chronic malnutrition while 
supporting subsistence farmers diversify their crops and improve 
household income.230 They also included building the region’s resilience 
to withstand shocks produced from climate change (e.g., droughts or 
floods) and improvement in the quality and access to education for these 
most vulnerable communities that had been historically left out.231 
In the area of governance, efforts in the region had started to focus on 
issues of fiscal accountability and transparency in the collection and 
distribution of public resources; supporting the judiciary’s efforts to root-
out corruption; depoliticizing and professionalizing the hiring of public 
officials; strengthening the quality and flow of public information by 
protecting the press and human rights defenders.232 In the area of security, 
the focus remained on supporting the military in their fight against 
organized crime but programs also expanded to strengthen policing and 
implementing crime and violence prevention measures by, inter alia, 
providing programs to youth to redirect them and support their decision 
and ability to turn away from crime.233 At least in terms of priorities, these 
efforts mirrored more closely some of the recommendations we made in 
our white paper about the types of changes and reforms desperately needed 
in the region to have a longer-term impact in improving the lives of Central 
Americans.234 
3. What is/Should be the Future of Foreign Aid in the Region 
President Biden, who as Vice President and Senator, played a 
significant role in advancing the Obama administration’s priorities in 
Central America, is well-positioned to improve on President Obama’s 
vision to help the region address the root-causes of forced migration in the 
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region in ways that also elevate their prospects to live happy and dignified 
lives home.235 It was President Biden, in fact, who helped secure consensus 
in Congress to secure President Obama’s multi-year strategy to reduce 
forced migration from the region.236 Moreover, Biden’s involvement in the 
region, characterized as tough but also fair and guided by a moral compass 
that the U.S. owes the region, lends him credibility to restore much of the 
distrust against the U.S. and the political polarization that has intensified 
in the region under the Trump administration.237 In fact, uncommonly so, 
President Biden not only included addressing the root causes of forced 
migration from the Northern Triangle as part of his plan on immigration,238 
but also adopted an independent plan for the region as part of his 
campaign.239 
The first notable characteristic of President Biden’s Central American 
plan is its tone which treats these nations as partners and friends, not only 
based on regional proximity but on shared history and values.240 The plan 
is grounded in five pillars: (1) a $4 billion, four–year regional strategy; (2) 
mobilizing private investment; (3) a focus on security and improving the 
rule of law; (4) addressing endemic corruption; and (5) prioritizing poverty 
reduction and economic development.241 Much of what is in President 
Biden’s plan is consistent with recommendations by experts who have 
studied the impact of good and bad U.S. foreign aid investments in the 
region.242 The plan makes clear that a condition of investment will be on 
those nation’s own verifiable investments and commitments to broader 
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Engagement to Address Migration From and Displacement Within the Northern Triangle 
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reforms to meet goals 3-5.243 Another welcomed aspect of the plan is a 
commitment to target investments primarily in civil society organizations 
that are on the frontlines of addressing root causes of forced migration, 
while recognizing the central role of women as powerful forces for 
development.244 This will be especially important in countries like 
Honduras and El Salvador, which, due to upcoming elections, if monies 
are funneled through central governments, could divert these resources for 
political gain.245 It is also a welcome policy change to return to an anti-
corruption agenda, which had made significant progress, at least in 
Guatemala, until those efforts were stalled or even reversed during the 
Trump administration.246 Additionally, it is gratifying to see a 
commitment, based on evidenced-based practices worldwide,247 to engage 
in anti-violence efforts by supporting youth with alternative programs that 
can help them escape a dangerous life in criminal gangs and victims of 
domestic violence, not only with prosecutions, but with support to escape 
their abusers.248 
Finally, the plan makes a commitment to poverty alleviation, such as 
through programs that address food insecurity and chronic malnutrition, 
especially alongside the dry corridor, but also through sustained economic 
development that prioritizes human development and addresses climate 
change. The plan also makes assertions to incentivize economic 
development through foreign investment, including by ensuring more 
favorable laws (i.e., labor laws) for investors. President Biden’s optimism 
should be more cautious here and be more informed by the role of private 
foreign investment in the region. Liberalizing policies that have promoted 
deregulation of natural resources and environmental protections, while 
leaving workers largely unprotected, despite strong labor laws, have not 
been good for poverty alleviation or economic development in the 
region.249 This is not to say that foreign investment cannot be good for the 
 
243 The Biden Central American Plan, supra note 236. 
244 This is very consistent with the recommendations in our white paper that we label 
decentralization. See Aldana et al., supra note 3, at 12-14. 
245 Political Integrity Lacking in Latin America and the Caribbean, Especially Around 
Elections, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.transparency.org/en/news/political-integrity-lacking-in-latin-america-and-
the-caribbean-especially-a. 
246 See, e.g., Adeline Hite & Álvaro Montenegro, Guatemala’s Corrupt are Threatening 
to Erase its Historic Anti-Corruption Legacy, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AMERICA (Jan. 8, 
2020), https://www.wola.org/analysis/guatemalas-corrupt-threaten-historic-anti-
corruption-legacy/. 
247 See generally Violence prevention: the evidence, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
(2010), https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/the-evidence/en/. 
248 The Biden Central American Plan, supra note 236. 
249 See generally Raquel Aldana & Steven W. Bender, FROM EXTRACTION TO 
EMANCIPATION: DEVELOPMENT REIMAGINED (Carolina Academic Press 2018). 
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region but as the plan reads currently only the voices of private industries 
are heard. Left out are the workers and vulnerable communities who have 
endured labor exploitation, extraction of their resources, a lack of antitrust 
protections, land displacements, and other affronts to their personal 
security based on bad investment practices with the acquiescence of local 
governments and the international community.250 
III. CONCLUSION 
The bleak COVID-19 and post-hurricane outlook for Northern 
Triangle nations requires an urgent and coordinated response to the most 
pressing human needs—such as hunger, housing, and health access. It also 
presents a meaningful opportunity to adopt policies and practices that can 
simultaneously bring longer-term gains to the region, including in terms 
of security. As an example, experts examining the adaptation of violence 
to pandemic in the region note that the provision of emergency funds into 
the most affected communities to help them survive the crisis will also 
strengthen their resolve and ability to turn away from the pressures of 
organized crime and also, potentially, from fleeing north.251 At the same 
time, other experts urge the U.S. to view the region anew as a unique 
opportunity to advance toward greater regional economic integration by 
capturing the region’s potential, based on a young labor force and the 
presence of Asian investors in the region, to play a prominent role in 
production in a reconfigured global supply chains.252 This essay provided 
a few immediate actions the U.S. can take to help stabilize the region not 
only for its own sake but for our own. 
 
250 See id.; see also e.g., Raquel Aldana & Randall S. Abate, Banning Metal Mining in 
Guatemala, 40 VT. L. REV. 597 (2016). 
251 INT’L CRISIS GRP, supra note 37, at 18. 
252 Brizuela de Ávila et al., supra note 23. 
